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THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE FOR PUBLIC 




Last year, a New York court convicted a man named Mayer 
Herskovic of gang assault and sentenced him to four years in prison.1 
A few years earlier, across the country, a California court found 
another man named Billy Ray Johnson guilty of twenty-four crimes, 
including multiple counts of rape; the court sentenced Mr. Johnson to 
life in prison without parole and 300 years to life, plus 123 years.2 
The two cases have little in common—except that both men were 
convicted on the basis of a new and largely untested method of 
processing tiny bits of DNA. In Mr. Johnson’s case, that was 
notwithstanding the fact that a witness to one of the alleged crimes 
reported that the perpetrator was a “light-skinned Hispanic with 
green eyes,” and Mr. Johnson is Black with brown eyes.3 In both 
cases, the prosecution relied on DNA statistics generated by 
proprietary probabilistic genotyping programs—computerized 
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 1. Lauren Kirchner, Traces of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evidence-new-york-
disputed-techniques.html [https://perma.cc/K9ZE-Z2AF]. 
 2. Jason Kotowski, ‘Eastside Rapist’ Billy Ray Johnson to Spend Rest of his Life Behind Bars, 
BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN (May 19, 2015), http://www.bakersfield.com/news/eastside-rapist-billy-
ray-johnson-to-spend-rest-of-his/article_c1d62989-e01b-5043-8233-9cb7524a4028.html 
[https://perma.cc/RA4Q-49H9]. As a Fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union, the Author is 
counsel for amici curiae in Mr. Johnson’s case. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties 
Union et al. at 11, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017). [hereinafter “ACLU 
Amicus Brief”]. 
 3. Kotowski, supra note 2. 
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algorithms used to identify a suspect from a tiny, degraded DNA 
sample swimming in a soup of many individuals’ DNA. Both cases 
are now on appeal, in part based on concerns about those stastics and 
their underlying algorithms.4 
In today’s world, computerized algorithms impact our lives in 
crucial ways. Such algorithms can decide whether we get a job 
interview,5 go to a particular college,6 access credit,7 and receive 
insurance.8 They can also inform what news we see9 and what beliefs 
we hold.10 And, as shown by the examples above, it is not only 
private actors who are using computerized algorithms. Increasingly, 
the government is too. 
In fact, the government now relies on algorithms to make profound 
decisions about our lives, including what level of health benefits we 
receive,11 whether we can work for the government,12 what risk we 
                                                                                                                 
 4. California v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. appeal docketed June 1, 2015) (Mr. Johnson’s 
appeal); see Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica Seeks Source Code for New York City’s Disputed DNA 
Software, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 25, 2017, 7:54 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/propublica-seeks-
source-code-for-new-york-city-disputed-dna-software [https://perma.cc/6G6B-57TU] (discussing Mr. 
Herskovic’s appeal). 
 5. Gideon Mann & Cathy O’Neil, Hiring Algorithms Are Not Neutral, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 9, 
2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/hiring-algorithms-are-not-neutral [https://perma.cc/BHY3-YAVK]. 




 7. Kaveh Waddell, How Algorithms Can Bring Down Minorities’ Credit Scores, ATLANTIC (Dec. 
2, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/how-algorithms-can-bring-down-
minorities-credit-scores/509333/ [https://perma.cc/C7S4-PU4P]. 
 8. Oliver Ralph, Insurance: Robots Learn the Business of Covering Risk, FIN. TIMES (May 16, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/e07cee0c-3949-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23 [https://perma.cc/UH8W-
2CHE]. 
 9. Julia Carrie Wong, Facebook Overhauls News Feed in Favor of ‘Meaningful Social 
Interactions,’ GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2018, 9:31 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jan/11/facebook-news-feed-algorithm-overhaul-mark-
zuckerberg [https://perma.cc/4RPL-ZEL7]. 
 10. Tom Simonite, Machines Taught by Photos to Learn Sexist View of Women, WIRED (Aug. 21, 
2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/machines-taught-by-photos-learn-a-sexist-view-of-
women/ [http://perma.cc/Z5C9-LEUG]. 
 11. Across the country, states are relying on proprietary algorithms to allocate Medicaid benefits. A 
number of courts have expressed skepticisim regarding the constitutionality of such algorithms. See, 
e.g., Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *10 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 13, 
2016) (finding that the proprietary algorithm used by government to set Medicaid benefits “present[s] a 
serious risk of resulting in erroneous determinations and deprivations”). At least one court has held that 
such algorithms violate due process. K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 718 (D. Idaho 2016) 
(holding that the proprietary tool used to allocate Medicaid benefits “arbitrarily deprives participants of 
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pose as parents,13 whether or not we get charged with a crime,14 and 
how we should be treated if we do get charged with a crime.15 
Although the government creates and maintains some of these 
algorithms, many are built by private actors who have a business 
interest in keeping them secret from competitors.16 And it is now 
increasingly common for courts to allow the owners of proprietary 
algorithms who cry “trade secret!” to keep the details of the 
algorithms hidden, both from the public and from private litigants 
(including accused individuals like Mr. Johnson and Mr. 
Herskovic).17 
                                                                                                                 
their property rights and hence violates due process”). 
 12. Similarly, another court held that the use of an algorithm to determine whether or not to fire 
teachers could violate their due process rights. Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 13. See, e.g., Virginia Eubanks, A Child Abuse Prediction Model Fails Poor Families, WIRED (Jan. 
16, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/excerpt-from-automating-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/J75F-
BDUY] (noting that Pittsburgh’s “Allegheny Family Screening Tool,” which the city uses to identify 
children at risk of abuse or neglect, unfairly targets low-income and minority families); Dan Hurley, 
Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/magazine/can-an-algorithm-tell-when-kids-are-in-danger.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q9NS-GFRS] (discussing use of algorithm by Pittsburgh child protective services and 
noting that the private company’s refusal to disclose components of child-welfare alghorithm led Illinois 
Department of Children and Family Services to stop using the program). 
 14. See discussion of probabilistic genotyping algorithms infra Section I. 
 15. TIM BRENNAN ET AL., ENHANCING PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS: THE EMERGING ROLE OF 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS 9 (2004), 
https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/019687.pdf [https://perma.cc/77T8-5NRA] (encouraging use of 
algorithms to classify incarcerated individuals for housing, treatment, and resource allocation). 
 16. Lauren Kirchner, Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails, Algorithms Take Over, PROPUBLICA 
(Nov. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/where-traditional-dna-testing-fails-
algorithms-take-over [https://perma.cc/B48T-ULCW] (explaining that STRmix was developed by a 
New Zealand-Australia collaborative and is sold in the United States by a company called Nichevision, 
and TrueAllele is owned and marketed by a company called Cybergenetics); see also Rebecca Wexler, 
Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7 n.21) (draft available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2920883) [https://perma.cc/5B2A-X9TG] (noting 
that “STRmix is sold for profit around the world”). 
 17. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing Controversy 
Over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 100–01 (2016) 
(identifying “two primary waves” of criminal cases raising the issue of a trade secret’s privilege, 
including the current wave); Jennifer N. Mellon, Manufacturing Convictions: Why Defendants Are 
Entitled to the Data Underlying Forensic DNA Kits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1097, 1116–19 (2001) (noting that 
courts have upheld trade secret privilege “in the context of DNA kit testing”); Erin Murphy, The New 
Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 721, 729 (2007) (noting that traditional DNA typing also “weathered a series of challenges 
related to the reluctance of private companies to divulge claimed proprietary secrets”); Wexler, supra 
note 16, at 14–18, 41–44 (describing recent cases denying defense motions for the disclosure of 
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But, as this Article sets forth, once a computerized algorithm is 
used by the government, constitutional rights may attach.18 And, at 
the very least, those rights require that algorithms used by the 
government as evidence in criminal trials be made available—both to 
litigants and the public. 
Scholars have discussed how the government’s refusal to disclose 
such algorithms runs afoul of defendants’ constitutional rights,19 but 
few have considered the public’s interest in these algorithms—or the 
widespread impact that public disclosure and auditing could have on 
ensuring their quality.20 
This Article aims to add to that discussion by setting forth a theory 
of the public’s First Amendment right of access to algorithms used as 
evidence in criminal trials. This Article uses probabilistic genotyping 
programs as an illustrative example, largely because the creators of 
these algorithms have most aggressively pushed to keep them 
secret.21 Section I begins by defining the relevant terms, including 
computerized algorithms, probabilistic genotyping program, machine 
learning, and source code. Section II describes the roles that humans 
play in designing, building, operating, and communicating the results 
of such algorithms—and the variety of errors and mistakes that 
almost inevitably result. Section III summarizes caselaw articulating 
the public’s First Amendment right of access and suggests how and 
                                                                                                                 
purported trade secret evidence used to determine guilt at trial, including probabilistic genotyping 
algorithms and tracing emergence of “the criminal trade secret privilege” in the 1990s, followed by a 
second wave in mid-2000s regarding the breathalyzer source code, and again now regarding 
probabilistic genotyping algorithms). 
 18. See, e.g., Houston Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 
1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017); K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 715 (D. Idaho 2016); T. v. 
Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 WL 4870284, at *7 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016); State v. Loomis, 
881 N.W.2d 749, 759–60, 763 (Wis. 2016) (recognizing that use of a risk assessment tool without 
disclosing its source code involves “potential due process violations”). 
 19. See Christian Chessman, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the 
Constitution, 105 CAL. L. REV. 179, 219–21 (2017); Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 118; Andrea Roth, 
Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2043–45 (2017); see also Mellon, supra note 17, at 1122–37 
(2001) (identifying compulsory process, confrontation clause, and due process arguments for requiring 
defense access to the data underlying traditional DNA testing); Murphy, supra note 17, at 791 (raising 
due process and assistance of counsel arguments in the context of access to information about traditional 
DNA testing). 
 20. See infra Section III.A. 
 21. See infra note 34. 
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why that right should attach to computerized algorithms used as 
evidence in criminal trials. 
I.   Computerized Algorithms Explained 
A.   Algorithms Broadly 
At the most elementary level, an algorithm is a series of steps that 
transforms inputs into an output.22 It is, essentially, a formula, a 
manual, a recipe. Something as simple as a blog post explaining how 
to boil an egg is an algorithm because it directs the transformation of 
inputs (a saucepan, a stovetop, water, a raw egg, and possibly other 
inputs) into the desired output (a cooked egg). A probabilistic 
genotyping program is an example of a more complicated algorithm. 
It sets forth the steps to transform inputs, described in detail below, 
into an output: a statistic that establishes the likelihood that a 
particular suspect is the source of a specific (typically small and often 
degraded) DNA sample contained in a mixture of multiple peoples’ 
DNA. 
Not all algorithms aimed at accomplishing the same goal are 
identical. Indeed, they often differ in terms of both inputs and steps 
due to differences in their underlying assumptions. For example, a 
boiled egg can be made with or without salt or ice water and can be 
cooked for different amounts of time. Each approach constitutes an 
egg-making algorithm—but, critically, the quality of the result may 
differ. 
Similarly, the algorithms used to generate a DNA match statistic 
differ due to differences in underlying assumptions, inputs, and 
training datasets—and so too must the quality of their output. And, of 
course, differences in quality of DNA statistics that are introduced at 
trial to put human beings behind bars or even render them eligible for 
death are of an entirely different order. Despite that, as discussed 
further below, the quality of that output is far more difficult to assess 
than is the quality of a hard boiled egg because of the issue at the 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See THOMAS CORMEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (3d ed. 2009). 
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center of this article: the public lacks access to information about the 
algorithms. 
B.   Computerized Algorithms 
The phrase computerized algorithms refers to the growing 
subcategory of algorithms that determine their steps and parameters 
not only from human assumptions but also machine learning. 
Machine learning occurs when a computer identifies patterns from a 
preexisting or training set of data, learns from those patterns, and 
incorporates the lessons into the algorithm. Probabilistic genotyping 
programs fall within this subset because they combine human 
assumptions and machine learning. 
As noted above, the desired output for probabilistic genotyping 
programs is a statistic that expresses the likelihood that a particular 
suspect is the source of a specific DNA sample—usually a tiny, 
degraded sample swimming in a larger pool of many individuals’ 
genetic material. These samples can be scraped from, for example, a 
convenience store counter, a purse strap, a knife handle, or a bike’s 
handlebars.23 This step is done as it always has been: law 
enforcement collects the sample and then a lab amplifies it for 
analysis.24 From there, however, probabilistic genotyping diverges 
from traditional forensic DNA analysis.25 
Although traditional DNA analysis looks for a match to a single 
person’s known genetic profile, probabilistic genotyping must first 
sketch that profile—based on the algorithms’ inputs, discussed 
below—before searching for a match.26 Essentially, using traditional 
DNA analysis is like looking at a photograph, while using a 
probabilistic genotyping algorithm is like relying on an investigator’s 
composite sketch.27 Proponents of these programs contend that they 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Kirchner, supra note 16; Liz Robbins, Helping Decide Guilt or Innocence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/nyregion/a-forensic-tool-helps-decide-guilt-or-
innocence.html [https://perma.cc/PL4G-756S]. 
 24. Katherine L. Moss, The Admissibility of Trueallele: A Computerized DNA Interpretation System, 
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033, 1059–60 (2015). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Roth, supra note 19, at 2018–19. 
 27. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 2. 
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make it possible to generate matches from precisely the sort of 
samples that traditional DNA analysis cannot reach, while critics 
contend that their reliability is uncertain.28 
Probabilistic genotyping algorithms typically express their output 
as a likelihood ratio, a statistic that is computed by dividing (1) the 
estimated probability that the owner of the DNA in the tested sample 
has the suspect’s DNA profile by (2) the probability that a random 
person of a particular race or ethnicity has the suspect’s DNA 
profile.29 Or, as one court explained, 
the numerator . . . represents the chance that the 
prosecution hypothesis is true—that a particular individual 
was one of the contributors to a mixture. The denominator 
represents the chance that the defense hypothesis is true—
that other random individuals, and not the one of interest to 
the prosecution, were the contributors. Division of the 
numerator by the denominator produces the likelihood 
ratio.30 
Thus, the goal of probabilistic genotyping programs is the same, 
but the inputs and precise steps (and therefore, resulting outputs) vary 
across programs. How they differ is something of a mystery, though, 
because many are not public. Two of the most popular programs—
STRmix, which claims 54% of the U.S. market share,31 and 
TrueAllele, which had been used in approximately 500 criminal cases 
by 201632—are marketed to governments for profit.33 And the 
companies behind them refuse to disclose the precise components of 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Kirchner, supra note 16; Robbins, supra note 23. 
 29. See William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still Controversial in Some Cases, 
2012 CHAMPION 12, 23 n.17, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214459 [https://perma.cc/VU96-BZMN]. 
 30. People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 577 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 31. Wexler, supra note 17, at 66. 
 32. Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 100–01. 
 33. See Kirchner, supra note 16 (explaining that STRmix was developed by a New Zealand-
Australia collaborative and is sold in the United States by a company called Nichevision, and TrueAllele 
is owned and marketed by a company called Cybergenetics); see also Wexler, supra note 17, at 7 n.21 
(noting that “STRmix is sold for profit around the world”). 
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their algorithms, asserting that they are trade secrets.34 At least one 
such program, Forensic Statistical Tool (FST), was developed by a 
government actor, which also asserted a private property interest in 
the algorithm until the program was shelved in 2017.35 At the same 
time, a variety of less popular probabilistic genotyping programs are 
available for free and are open source.36 
All of these algorithms are “computerized” because the programs’ 
human designers or operators appear to determine and input most of 
the baseline assumptions, but the programs also learn from existing 
datasets of DNA markers and populations. Although the precise 
inputs of many of these programs are not public, many probabilistic 
genotyping algorithms appear to include a bevy of assumptions: the 
number of contributors to a particular DNA sample; the race or 
ethnicity of the comparison population; the quantity of DNA from 
each contributor; the degree to which the DNA is degraded; the 
probability that certain alleles may not be picked up; and more.37 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Wexler, supra note 17, at 1; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 111 (describing second 
wave of cases regarding “trade secrets” privilege in criminal cases as focused on “probabilistic 
genotyping programs, notably TrueAllele”); Roth, supra note 19, at 2028 (“Creators of proprietary 
algorithms typically argue that the source code is a trade secret.”); Stephanie M. Lee, People Are Going 
to Prison Thanks to DNA Software—But How It Works Is Secret, BUZZFEED (March 18, 2016, 8:46 
PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/stephaniemlee/dna-software-
code?utm_term=.ar2No4palG#.ljeLOzEm4j [https://perma.cc/GV3Y-3UMA]; STRmix, Access to 
STRmix Software by Defence Legal Teams (April 2016), 
https://strmix.esr.cri.nz/assets/Uploads/Defence-Access-to-STRmix-April-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZL5A-2ML5]. 
 35. See Robbins, supra note 23; Kirchner, supra note 1. New York’s Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner developed FST. Kirchner, supra note 1. Prosecutors used FST in New York courts from July 
2011 through 2017, and numerous courts recognized a proprietary interest in the government’s software. 
Robbins, supra note 23; see, e.g., New York v. Carter, No. 2573/14, slip op. at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 
2016) (denying the defendant’s discovery motion for FST source code because “the source code is 
proprietary software copyrighted by the city of New York”); see also Wexler, supra note 17, at 18 n.73 
(string cite of New York state cases refusing to disclose FST code because of OCME’s ownership 
interest in the program). A federal court, on the other hand, has questioned “why a public laboratory 
would need a protective order in this context.” Wexler, supra note 17, at 47 (citing orders in United 
States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2016)). 
 36. See Kirchner, supra note 16 (identifying at least four such programs, including LRmix, 
EuroForMix, Lab Retriever, and LikeLTD—the last of which benefited from public scrutiny that 
exposed a significant bug). 
 37. Roth, supra note 19, at 1994–97, 1996 n.119; Thompson, supra note 29, at 18. 
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II.   Computerized Algorithms Are Human Constructs, Subject to 
Mistake 
Like most other sources of evidence, computerized algorithms are 
neither inherently good nor inherently bad. As this Section explains, 
they are merely tools designed, built, and operated by humans to 
mechanize the analysis of data. And they do so with varying degrees 
of accuracy. This is not surprising—but, as Section III lays out, it 
becomes a problem of constitutional magnitude when the algorithms 
are kept hidden from the public, and their accuracy cannot be 
assessed or sufficiently questioned. 
A.   Algorithms Are Not Infallible Oracles 
Notwithstanding the complexity of computerized algorithms, when 
their results are introduced in court, legal experts and prosecutors 
generally suggest that they are infallible and that their results are 
foolproof, “overstat[ing] the probative value of their evidence, going 
far beyond what the relevant science can justify.”38 And juries, 
frequently deprived of the source code or any countervailing 
testimony that could expose the algorithm’s potential pitfalls, 
generally do not question the prosecution’s results. 
This same issue arises when juries consider older and more 
traditional forensic “science,” like bitemark, fingerprint, hair, fiber, 
and tire tread analysis. According to the Innocence Project, 
“Misapplication of forensic science is the second most common 
contributing factor to wrongful convictions, found in nearly half 
(45%) of DNA exoneration cases.”39 Even with regard to relatively 
established science like fingerprint analysis, “longstanding claims 
                                                                                                                 
 38. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL 
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 29 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science
_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL9N-2TLP] [hereinafter PCAST]; Murphy, supra note 17, at 765 
(arguing that even defense attorneys may be startstruck by complex forensic evidence). 
 39. Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ [https://perma.cc/GL69-
RNRL] (last visited June 17, 2018). 
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about [its] infallibility” are likely to instill more juror trust in their 
results than the science warrants.40 And while traditional DNA 
analysis, which is limited to searching for matches for single source 
or “simple mixture” samples (defined as mixtures with no more than 
two contributors), is a “foundationally valid and reliable method” and 
is highly trusted by juries, it too “is not infallible in practice.”41 
Subjective interpretation of DNA mixtures with more than two 
contributors is far less established. In Texas, for example, 
recalculation of statistics after forensic laboratories changed how 
they dealt with a common source of missing data in a DNA sample 
resulted in drastic and material changes in statistics—including “from 
1 in 1.4 billion to 1 in 36 in one case, and from 1 in 4,000 to 
inconclusive in another.”42 According to the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology, probabilistic genotyping 
algorithms offer a more promising approach—but one that has yet to 
be sufficiently tested by independent groups or evaluated on samples 
as complex as those it is used for in the real world.43 
Jurors therefore have a serious propensity to trust the results of 
probabilistic genotyping more than they should based on the largely 
untested science, which combines DNA evidence—”powerful new 
evidence unlike anything known before”44—with mechanized data 
analysis that offers an additional sheen of objectivity, neutrality, and 
complexity.45 Moreover, the outputs of these programs can appear 
                                                                                                                 
 40. PCAST, supra note 38, at 9. 
 41. Id. at 73; see also Patt Morrison, Barry Scheck on the O.J. Trial, DNA Evidence and the 
Innocence Project, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
0618-morrison-scheck-oj-simpson-20140618-column.html [https://perma.cc/PM9N-3GU4]. 
 42. PCAST, supra note 38, at 77. 
 43. Id. at 80–82. 
 44. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009); PCAST, 
supra note 38, at 45 (describing finding that mock jurors heavily underestimated the error rates of 
qualified, experienced forensic scientists); see also Murphy, supra note 17, at 753 (“It is far easier to 
imagine that once the government puts the evidence forward, it will be accepted without question as 
true.”); Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016), 
http://theatln.tc/2xs7XUL [https://perma.cc/6G6B-57TU] (describing the finding that sexual assault 
cases involving DNA evidence in Australia “were twice as likely to reach trial and 33 times as likely to 
result in a guilty verdict; homicide cases were 14 times as likely to reach trial and 23 times as likely to 
end in a guilty verdict”). 
 45. Thompson, supra note 29, at 18. 
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both simple and astronomical with likelihood ratios reaching into the 
billions and quintillions.46 
It is, therefore, almost inevitable that “[t]he potential prejudicial 
impact” of probabilistic genotyping results is “unusually high.”47 
Indeed, knowing the power of such evidence, most defendants plead 
guilty when confronted with “unfavorable [probabilistic genotyping 
algorithm] results.”48 And algorithms used for evidence can also 
determine the outcome of a case even if it goes to trial, as the 
algorithms arguably did in Mr. Herskovic’s and Mr. Johnson’s cases. 
This power, especially when compounded with the many potential 
sources for error discussed below, highlights the constitutional 
importance of public access to and adversarial testing of such 
algorithms. 
B.   Computerized Algorithms Are Designed, Built, and Operated 
By People 
Though computerized algorithms are often presented (and 
interpreted) as objective, all-knowing oracles, their design combines 
human assumptions with machine learning—and humans impact 
both. Algorithmic programs are composites of their underlying 
model; training data; source code; input parameters and data specific 
to each case; and the various results from which the final, reported 
one was chosen. Algorithms are designed, built, and operated by 
humans, and humans are the ones who translate the outputs into 
results that factfinders can understand. As a result, algorithms are 
vulnerable to human bias and mistake at each stage. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 18 n.4. In Mr. Johnson’s case, for example, the ratios 
introduced into evidence included 34,000; 1 million; 740 million; and 211 quintillion. Id. Although 
these numbers are striking, they do not necessarily translate to accuracy or validity. See Thompson, 
supra note 29, at 20. Their size reflects TrueAllele’s decision to “consider[] more information when 
making calculations” than traditional DNA testing does. ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 18 n.4. 
While traditional tests “generally consider only whether an allele is present or absent in a sample[,] 
TrueAllele also considers the height of the underlying peak and the presence or absence of technical 
artifacts that often accompany actual alleles.” Thompson, supra note 29, at 19. But its ability to reach 
higher numbers does not guarantee accuracy any more than a “gasoline gauge that [can tell] you there 
are 100 gallons in your tank,” rather than only 10, is guaranteed to be correct as a result. Id. at 20. 
 47. PCAST, supra note 38, at 45. 
 48. Kirchner, supra note 1. 
11
Eidelman: The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret Algorithms U
Published by Reading Room, 2018
926 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
1.   Design 
At the outset, humans determine the foundational assumptions that 
undergird algorithms. For probabilistic genotyping programs, these 
assumptions include whether something identified in a DNA sample 
constitutes stutter (i.e., random noise that can be ignored) or an actual 
allele (i.e., a characteristic that the suspect must match). The line 
between the two can determine whether or not a defendant is 
considered a statistical match to the sample—and that line is drawn 
by a human.49 Other assumptions include “the probability of unusual 
events—such as small amounts of contamination during testing,” 
which also “directly affect interpretation.”50 
On the machine learning side, humans also impact the algorithm’s 
design by, for example, choosing the training data—another decision 
that can have significant effects on the algorithm’s output and in 
ways that differentially affect suspects of different races, ethnicities, 
or ancestral backgrounds.51 
Recognizing the vast range of assumptions built into a 
probabilistic genotyping algorithm by design—and the defense’s 
inability to challenge any of them—one court refused to enter FST’s 
results into evidence. The court explained that a defense expert 
cannot, “for example, obtain a likelihood ratio based on a hypothesis 
that there were a larger or smaller number of contributors to the 
mixture than [the algorithm’s creator] supposes”; “that contributors 
are related”; or “how much an individual of a mixed race might differ 
from a person who is not.”52 But these assumptions are only the start 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 933–34 (D.C. 2007); see also Roth, supra note 19, 
at 1994–96. 
 50. Roth, supra note 19, at 1996. 
 51. See, e.g., New York v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 580–81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (crediting 
objection of two defense experts to FST because (1) it was trained on data with only “Asian, European, 
African, and Latino” categories, which is inadequate for identifying other races or ethnicities, and (2) 
the training data appeared to include only three Asian individuals, which was insufficient to determine 
false positive rates for people with Asian ancestry); Roth, supra note 19, at 1997 (discussing the 
importance and difficulty of identifying “the appropriate reference population for generating estimates 
of the rarity of genetic markers”); see also Kirchner, supra note 4 (noting that Mr. Herskovic, “a Hasidic 
Jew, . . . is now appealing his conviction . . . because FST was never tested on a population as insulated 
as the Hasidic Jews of Williamsburg, who very likely share many of the same ancestors, and therefore 
much of the same DNA”). 
 52. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d at 578. 
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss4/2
2018] PUBLIC ACCESS TO SECRET ALGORITHMS 927 
of human involvement in—and the creator and prosecution’s control 
of—probabilistic genotyping algorithms. 
2.   Building Algorithms and Translating Output 
Once the design is set, people operationalize the algorithm through 
source code, which is built from numbers, letters, symbols, and 
punctuation marks. Source code refers to the human-written 
instructions that tell a computer how to execute the algorithm.53 An 
error or “bug” as simple as a misplaced punctuation mark can 
materially alter the source code and result in a program that does not 
reflect the intended algorithm.54 The more complicated the code and 
the more difficult the problem the algorithm is attempting to solve, 
the higher the likelihood of bugs.55 The source code of probabilistic 
genotyping algorithms is likely to be affected by both issues: their 
selling point is the difficulty of the problem they attack, and their 
source code is complicated, with at least one program’s source 
running for more than 170,000 lines.56 To use the algorithm once it is 
designed and built, people must set the input parameters—for 
example, the assumed number of contributors to a DNA sample—and 
those choices, too, can make the difference between a conclusive and 
an inconclusive match.57 
Finally, at the output stage, people interpret the algorithm’s results 
and translate them into terms that others can understand. For 
example, they decide what magnitude of likelihood ratio qualifies as 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 102–03. 
 54. See Chessman, supra note 19, at 187; Roth, supra note 19, at 1994 (quoting Sergey Bratus et al., 
Software on the Witness Stand: What Should It Take for Us to Trust It?, in TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHY 
COMPUTING 396, 397 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2010)). 
 55. Roth, supra note 19, at 2024. 
 56. Id. at 2035 (noting that TrueAllele has more than 170,000 lines of source code). 
 57. See, e.g., Cybergenetics, TrueAllele Overview Video, YOUTUBE (May 1, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OU29b5sW88Y [https://perma.cc/8LEL-P485] (showing that 
TrueAllele allows analysts to set several variables, including the number of contributors to a DNA 
sample); Letter from Mark W. Perlin, Chief Sci. and Exec. Officer, Cybergenetics, to Jerry D. Varnell, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Procurement Section, at 3 (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2015/may/Letter_to_FBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/94A4-
F5WY] (acknowledging that some probabilistic genotyping algorithms “give different answers based on 
how an analyst sets their input parameters”). 
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conclusive.58 And, crucially, people—prosecutors, prosecution 
experts, and crime lab staff; not the algorithm itself, a computer, or 
other machine—decide which precise result to disclose to the jury.59 
C.   People Make Mistakes—And So Do Their Computerized 
Algorithms 
1.   Potential for Error 
At each of these stages, people will almost certainly make 
mistakes, impose their cognitive biases, and be tempted by perverse 
incentives. At the design stage, for example, cognitive biases can 
materially affect which variables people choose to include in an 
algorithm.60 Such biases can also affect how they interpret the 
results—including whether a DNA sample results in a match.61 And, 
at the coding stage, even highly experienced programmers have been 
found to make a mistake “in almost 1% of all expressions contained 
in [their] source code.”62 Mistakes occur even with tasks as simple as 
inputting “yes” or “no” to match the program’s parameters to a 
particular case.63 
And the fact that the people at each stage are different, with 
different areas of expertise, only compounds the possibility of 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that, in Mr. Johnson’s case, where the 
prosecution relied upon TrueAllele results, the two different experts who used the program disagreed on 
what likelihood ratio could be considered conclusive: the company’s threshold of exclusion was 1,000, 
and the state crime lab’s threshold was ten times that). 
 59. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 20 (describing a case in Northern Ireland in which TrueAllele 
generated four different likelihood ratios regarding the same defendant—389 million, 1.9 billion, 6.03 
billion, and 17.8 billion; the company chose to report the 6.03 billion statistic). 
 60. See discussion of human decisions in design supra Section II.B.i. 
 61. See Itiel E. Dror & Greg Hampikian, Subjectivity and Bias in Forensic DNA Mixture 
Interpretation, 51 SCI. & JUST. 204, 205 (2011) (finding that more DNA examiners determined that an 
individual matched a DNA mixture when they knew that he was a criminal defendant in a gang rape 
case than when they did not). 
 62. Chessman, supra note 19, at 186. 
 63. See Wexler, supra note 16, at 24–25 (describing how the evaluator tasked with calculating an 
incarcerated individual’s risk score mistakenly checked “yes” in response to a question when he should 
have checked “no”—a mistake that had previously inflated a risk score by a full category); see also 
Murphy, supra note 17, at 775 (detailing potential mistakes in traditional DNA analysis—”a 
manufacturer may contaminate a kit, an analyst may fail to run positive or negative controls, or a 
technican may erroneously input data into a database”—all of which would also affect the results of a 
probabilistic genotyping algorithm). 
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errors.64 When it comes to an issue as complex as translating 
probabilistic genotyping concepts into thousands of lines of code—
that is, combining the fields of forensic science, genetics, and 
probabilistic programming—people may simply have conceptual 
blind spots.65 While expert in one area, like programming, the 
purveyors of probabilistic genotyping algorithms may make errors 
due to an incomplete grasp of another area, like genetics.66 
Moreover, financial incentives may pervert the goals of the 
companies that build these algorithms.67 In the field of probabilistic 
genotyping, these dynamics are acute because the prosecution, 
backed by the resources of the state, is the most likely customer—and 
the prosecution is likely to be most satisfied with an algorithm that 
delivers a match.68 As a result, the private purveyors of programs like 
TrueAllele and STRmix may be incentivized to find a match, rather 
than the truth, to attract and retain business.69 Market forces are 
likely to bias results in this direction, notwithstanding the companies’ 
best intentions. Compounding that problem, private companies are 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 98, 103–04 (identifying various team members involved in 
drafting the source code and noting that a witness who testifies to present forensic algorithmic DNA 
evidence is not likely to “be a DNA analyst who personally analyzed” the DNA sample). 
 65. Chessman, supra note 19, at 188 (“Programmers might also be dealing with highly technical 
subject areas—such as physics, chemistry, and biology—that do not overlap with their training.”). 
 66. Id.; see also Kirchner, supra note 1 (quoting scientist at OCME as stating, “We don’t know 
what’s going on in that black box, and that is a legitimate question”). 
 67. See, e.g., CYBERGENETICS, TRUEALLELE CASEWORK TECHNOLOGY 4 (2015) (emphasis added), 
https://www.cybgen.com/products/casework/forensic_e-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/823Q-JB5F] 
(identifying the algorithm’s goal as delivering “a match statistic strong enough for court”); see also 
Murphy, supra note 17, at 749 (noting differences in incentives for geneticists, who typically look for 
“areas of the genetic strand that regulate human attributes, diseases, or characteristics” and “the forensic 
scientist[, who] most commonly studies those places at which genetic material has no demonstrable 
function or purpose . . . . To suggest that the geneticist’s broader interest in genomics validates DNA 
typing for forensic purposes is like suggesting that the widespread market for electricity somehow 
ensures the proper functioning of an electric chair.”). 
 68. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 749 (“Any company that develops a technology for forensic 
purposes inevitably allies closely with its primary customer, the government.”); Wexler, supra note 16, 
at 71 (“An agency that implements these tools and methods has already deemed them valid and reliable 
according to whatever procurement standards apply, and will have weak incentives to identify 
information that could prove otherwise.”). 
 69. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (“A forensic analyst responding 
to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the 
evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.”). 
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also more likely to push for secrecy, which keeps all of these errors 
hidden from the public.70 
For these reasons, algorithms are fallible. Although this may 
surprise laypeople or lawyers, computer scientists have long been 
acutely aware of this fact. They caution that “the evidence produced 
by computer programs is no more inherently reliable or truthful than 
the evidence produced by human witnesses.”71 
2.   Documented Error 
Experience has borne out this potential for fallibility. For example, 
in just the last few years, researchers documented a coding error in 
STRmix that produced incorrect results in sixty criminal cases in 
Australia, altering likelihood ratios by a factor of ten and forcing 
prosecutors to replace twenty-four expert statements in criminal 
cases.72 In New York, after a trial court ordered FST to release its 
source code, an expert witness for the defense discovered that “the 
program dropped valuable data from its calculations, in ways that 
users wouldn’t necessarily be aware of, but that could unpredictably 
affect the likelihood assigned to the defendant’s DNA being in the 
mixture.”73 In response, the prosecution withdrew the DNA evidence 
against the defendant.74 Earlier this year, the New York State 
Commission on Forensic Science “shelved” two previously-approved 
probabilistic genotyping algorithms for similar reasons,75 including 
one court that declined to admit related evidence because of expert 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101, 106 (2017), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/Joh-
FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSN8-7HTP] (noting this phenomenon in the context of policing); id. at 
125–26 (citing Cybergenetics’ secrecy regarding TrueAllele as an example of private companies 
pushing for secrecy); Murphy, supra note 17, at 750; Wexler, supra note 16, at 21–23 (discussing 
same). 
 71. Chessman, supra note 19, at 185. 
 72. David Murray, Queensland Authorities Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal 




 73. Kirchner, supra note 1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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testimony that challenged the assumptions underlying the algorithm 
and validation studies of it.76 
Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that each probabilistic genotyping 
algorithm claims to provide accurate results based on objective 
scientific principles, competing programs frequently reach 
meaningfully different results concerning the same forensic sample. 
For example, in one New York case, after prosecutors shopped 
around for the program that would generate the strongest match, two 
programs, TrueAllele and STRmix, reached different results.77 The 
judge refused to admit evidence from STRmix because the program 
had not been internally validated, and the defendant was acquitted.78 
In a Pennsylvania case, TrueAllele calculated a match statistic of 189 
billion, compared to a competitor’s estimate of 13,000—a more than 
14-million–fold difference.79 In Mr. Johnson’s case, two experts—
both employed by the prosecution—used TrueAllele to match the 
same DNA evidence to the same defendant, and yet calculated results 
that differed by a factor of more than ten.80 In a Northern Ireland 
case, TrueAllele analyzed a single forensic sample four times and 
generated four different likelihood ratios, the highest of which was 
more than forty-five times the lowest, notwithstanding the fact that 
the same lab was using the same program to analyze the same data 
each time.81 
These examples highlight not only the possibility of error, but also 
its significance in altering results. A wrong or even murky result is a 
serious problem, particularly given the level of trust that juries place 
in computerized alorithms.82 And it is a problem both for individuals 
accused of crimes, whose lives are put into jeopardy by faulty 
coding, and for prosecutors, whose cases can be upended by their 
introduction of unreliable evidence.83 Therefore, access to the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 578–82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 77. See New York v. Hillary, No. 2015-15 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Aug. 26, 2016). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Pennsylvania v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 887, 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 80. See ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 18. 
 81. See Thompson, supra note 29, at 20. 
 82. See supra Section II.A. 
 83. Shawn Musgrave, SJC to Decide Whether to Dismiss All Cases Connected to Former Drug Lab 
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computerized algorithms—including their underlying model; training 
data; source code; input parameters and data specific to each case; 
and the various results from which the final, reported one was 
chosen—is necessary. This can be achieved through motions for the 
First Amendment right of access, as Section III discusses. 
III.   The Public’s First Amendment Right of Access Attaches to 
Computerized Algorithms Used as Evidence in Criminal Trials 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
require that accused persons have access to the particular algorithm, 
datasets, and other parameters used for their trial, and such access 
may uncover issues specific to their particular case.84 But other 
widespread problems—whether in the algorithm’s design, its 
operationalization through source code, or the algorithm owner’s 
approach to delivering results—may be best addressed by 
recognizing the public’s right of access to the algorithms and 
enabling efficient auditing by independent experts. 
The First Amendment was designed to “assure [the] unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”85 As the architects of the 
Constitution explained, First Amendment protections are necessary 
not only for “the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in 
general” but also for the “diffusion of liberal sentiments on the 
administration of Government . . . whereby oppressive officers are 
                                                                                                                 
Chemist, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/01/30/sjc-decide-
whether-dismiss-all-cases-connected-former-drug-lab-chemist/74FLWu9e12lNFA3rfkM9ZO/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZA9E-K34C] (explaining that district attorneys have dismissed approximately 8,000 
cases affected by misconduct by a drug lab chemist in Massachusetts and may dismiss more); see, e.g., 
Shaer, supra note 44 (describing man who was exonerated after retesting). 
 84. The Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial 
work in tandem to guarantee accused persons a fundamentally fair process. See Holmes v. South 
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 319 (2006). In addition, the Sixth Amendment protects the right of a defendant 
to confront “the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause’s animating 
concern is “to ensure the reliability of the evidence . . . by subjecting it to rigorous testing.” Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). 
 85. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (finding that the Continental Congress made 
“[t]his objective . . . explicit as early as 1774”). 
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shamed or intimidated[] into more honourable and just modes of 
conducting affairs.”86 
In other words, public oversight and robust debate is foundational 
to democracy. Such oversight processes depend upon the government 
respecting the First Amendment “right to ‘receive information and 
ideas’”87 and not “limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw.”88 
The need for such oversight is perhaps strongest in the criminal 
justice system where the state wields its greatest power against 
individual liberty. As the Supreme Court of the United States has 
explained, “the criminal justice system exists in a larger context of a 
government ultimately of the people, who wish to be informed about 
happenings in the criminal justice system, and, if sufficiently 
informed about those happenings, might wish to make changes to the 
system.”89 For those reasons, “the right to attend criminal trials is 
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.”90 
This right of access is broad: indeed, the Supreme Court has 
cautioned that the right “must be taken as a command of the broadest 
scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving 
society, will allow.” 91 And algorithms used to produce evidence 
introduced by the prosecution in a criminal trial fit within this broad 
scope—especially if defense counsel has succeeded in making the 
algorithms part of the record of the case in order to rebut the resulting 
evidence. As noted above, other scholarship has explored arguments 
available to defense counsel to make the source code part of the 
record.92 The public’s First Amendment right to access that 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. (quoting 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774)). 
 87. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (quoting Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)). 
 88. Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 89. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1070 (1991). 
 90. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., Chessman, supra note 19, at 219–21. In addition to constitutional arguments, scholars 
have suggested challenges to the secrecy based in evidentiary law. See Imwinkelried, supra note 17, at 
121–24, 128–30; Wexler, supra note 16, at 14–18, 41–44 (challenging idea of a “criminal trade secret 
privilege”). 
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information, described more fully below, should in turn bolster the 
defendant’s arguments for making the algorithm part of the record.93 
A.   The Right of Access Attaches to Such Computerized 
Algorithms 
Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
First Amendment exists to enable democratic discourse; includes the 
right to “receive information and ideas”; and protects the right to 
access judicial proceedings and documents.94 This right of access is 
premised on “the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of 
[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs’” and that self-government is most effective and 
productive when the “constitutionally protected ‘discussion of 
governmental affairs’ is an informed one.”95 In other words, the right 
of access is “necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment 
rights.”96 
The right of access is most clearly established for access to, and 
information about, criminal trials.97 Indeed, the seminal case squarely 
recognizing a First Amendment right of access held that “a 
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial 
under our system of justice.”98 As previously noted, the Supreme 
Court has explained that the people have the ultimate say in how the 
criminal justice system operates; they “might wish to make changes 
to the system,”99 and the need for public oversight of government 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public 
trial may go even further than the First Amendment right in certain cases. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 
U.S. 209, 213 (2010); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (“Nevertheless, there can be little 
doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than 
the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.”). This suggests that each of the arguments 
made in this Section could equally be levied by a defendant in the context of a Sixth Amendment 
challenge. 
 94. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 
(1972)). 
 95. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982) (quoting Mills 
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
 96. Id. at 604. 
 97. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572. 
 98. Id. at 573. 
 99. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1070. 
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process is strongest in criminal trials, where the state wields its 
greatest power to affect individual liberty.100 
The prevailing test for deciding when the right attaches is the 
“experience and logic test,” which states that the right of public 
access attaches to any type of judicial process or record that (a) has 
historically been open to the public and (b) would benefit from public 
access and oversight.101 Criminal trials easily meet the history prong 
of the test given this country’s “unbroken, uncontradicted history” of 
access to criminal trials.102 And they also meet the logic prong 
because, as the Supreme Court has explained, public access improves 
criminal justice by “enhanc[ing the] quality and safeguard[ing] the 
integrity,” “heightening public respect for,” and “permit[ting] the 
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial 
process.”103 
1.   Algorithms As Part of Record 
For the right of access to criminal trials to have meaning and bear 
fruit, the presumption of access must apply broadly to all materials 
essential to the criminal proceeding—including algorithmic source 
code used as evidence in a criminal case. Appellate courts around the 
country have recognized that the right of access to criminal 
proceedings attaches to materials in the full record of a criminal case. 
This includes records—like motions, memorandum, affidavits, 
trancripts, and exhibits—from hearings before, during, and after the 
proceedings and access to the hearings themselves, including 
suppression hearings, pretrial release hearings, and closed 
hearings.104 Thus, where the defense or prosecution has made an 
                                                                                                                 
 100. The importance of public access to criminal trials is also embedded in the common law. See, e.g., 
Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). The Sixth Amendment, which 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a public trial, is embedded in the common law as well. See, 
e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268–69 (1948); Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (“[T]here can be little doubt that 
the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit 
First Amendment right of the press and public.”). 
 101. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986). 
 102. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572–73. 
 103. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606. 
 104. See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he First Amendment right 
of access extends to materials submitted in conjunction with judicial proceedings that themselves would 
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algorithm’s source code part of the record, the argument for the 
public’s right to access that source code is clear.105   
Indeed, one scholar, Rebecca Wexler, has found that “[e]arly 
historical sources suggest that the [trade secrets] privilege”—
precisely the tool companies are now using to keep algorithms out of 
the record of criminal cases—”was unavailable in criminal 
proceedings” until the 1990s.106 This suggests that existing caselaw 
that has allowed companies to keep their source code hidden on the 
basis of that privilege is blocking from view information that would 
historically have been public.107 
And the “logic” case for access to such information is perhaps 
even clearer. Openness in the context of algorithms used to produce 
evidence of guilt has immense public value. This country has a long 
                                                                                                                 
trigger the right to access.”); California First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 874 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (listing cases identifying “pretrial suppression hearings,” “pretrial release proceedings and 
documents,” “transcripts of closed hearings that occurred during the course of jury deliberations,” and 
“plea agreements and related documents” as covered by the First Amendment right of access); In re New 
York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (right of access attaches to suppression motions and 
exhibits); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (same for plea agreements); 
United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985) (same for trial exhibits); In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 47 (1st Cir. 1984) (same for memorandum, affidavits and transcripts in 
criminal case). 
 105. Some courts have (erroneously) applied a narrower test to determine when the First Amendment 
right-of-access attaches, looking only to the nature of a particular document rather than the proceedings 
themselves. See In re Boston Herald, 321 F.3d 174, 182–84 (1st Cir. 2003) (reviewing this case law). 
Algorithmic source code used to produce evidence of guilt in a criminal case should fall within even this 
too-narrow reading, as the right of access has historically attached to materials essential to the 
government’s case-in-chief and such access has improved the process of assessing that evidence. See, e.g., 
Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 798 F.2d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1986) (transcripts of exhibits); 
United States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930, 934–36 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (tax returns admitted into evidence); 
In re Application of WFMJ Broad. Co., 566 F. Supp. 1040, 1040 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (tapes played to jury 
in open court); United States v. Scott, 48 M.J. 663, 666, 667 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (materials entered 
into evidence at trial); In re Times-World Co., 488 S.E.2d 677, 684 (Va. 1997) (documents submitted into 
evidence). 
 106. Wexler, supra note 16, at 41–45 (identifying only two pre-1900 cases that considered whether 
trade secrets must be disclosed in criminal trials: R v. Maha Rajah Nundocomar, 20 Howell State Trials 
923, 1057 (1775) and R v. Webb, 174 Eng. Rep. 140 (1834), both of which held that the secrets must be 
disclosed). 
 107. While the trade secrets at issue in Maha Rajah Nundocomar and Webb (for example, the 
ingredients of a pill), see Wexler, supra note 16, at 41, are not equivalent to algorithmic source code, the 
“experience” prong “is not meant . . . to be construed so narrowly” as to exclude from First Amendment 
coverage proceedings or documents that are of “relatively recent vintage.” In re Boston Herald, 321 
F.3d at 184. Rather, in such cases, courts look to analogous proceedings and documents of the same 
“type or kind.” Rivera–Puig v. Garcia–Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 323 (1st Cir. 1992). Here, the relevant 
category is material evidence based on purported trade secrets. 
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history of junk science being used as evidence in criminal cases 
under the guise of technological advance and of public access to and 
analysis of such evidence debunking it.108 Indeed, courts—including 
the Supreme Court, state supreme courts, and federal appellate 
courts—look to work done by the public, rather than either party or 
its experts in a criminal case, to determine what rights and standards 
attach to evidence based on specific technologies.109 At least one 
court has already recognized that, when it comes to proprietary 
algorithms specifically, “[i]t is incumbent upon the criminal justice 
system to recognize that in the coming months and years, additional 
research data will become available . . . . The justice system must 
keep up with the research and continuously assess the use of these 
tools.”110 Moreover, the system should enable the access necessary 
for that research. 
Public scrutiny has had substantial benefits outside of the 
courtroom as well, leading to important improvements in 
investigative fields. For example, after a New Yorker article exposed 
a flawed case based on fire-science evidence, Texas not only 
“reconsider[ed] old cases that had been improperly handled by the 
original investigators” but also “reinvented itself as a leader in arson 
science and investigation” by “revamp[ing] the state’s training and 
investigative standards.”111 
All of this is true of DNA evidence as well. In the DNA field, 
“[b]oth the initial recognition of serious problems and the subsequent 
development of reliable procedures were aided by the existence of a 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 17, at 724 (describing the “shocking degree to which the criminal 
justice system has historically failed to prevent the government from deploying spurious sciences and 
faulty or fraudulent evidence,” including “evidentiary stalwarts like handwriting, voice exemplars, hair 
and fiber, bite and tool marks, and even fingerprints”); Shaer, supra note 44 (same). 
 109. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319–321 (2009); Han Tak Lee v. Houtzdale 
SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2015) (discussing changes in “fire science”); Michigan v. Davis, 72 
N.W.2d 269, 282 (Mich. 1955) (“The testimony of Dr. Snyder shows that it is of the greatest value and is 
quite generally used with very good results. It seems, however, that it has not as yet reached the dignity 
of positive evidence.”); New York v. Leone, 255 N.E.2d 696, 698 (N.Y. 1969) (relying on commentary 
of outside experts to hold that evidence derived from polygraph tests was not fit for admission). 
 110. Wisconsin v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016). 
 111. Jeremy Stahl, The Trials of Ed Graf, SLATE (Aug. 15, 2015, 9:02 PM), http://slate.me/2wdpTUA 
[https://perma.cc/5MYK-9R53]; see also David Grann, Trial By Fire, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [https://perma.cc/U8FX-R977]. 
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robust community of molecular biologists” and by “judges who 
recognized that this powerful forensic method should only be 
admitted as courtroom evidence once its reliability was properly 
established.”112 This is also true of algorithmic evidence. Indeed, 
public review of the source code at issue here has already proven its 
worth. In a 2008 case, public review of breathalyzer source code led 
the New Jersey Supreme Court to require modifications to prevent 
misleadingly high readings.113 
In 2017, United States v. Kevin Johnson became the first case to 
make the benefit of public access to probabilistic genotyping 
algorithms specifically clear. The judge in that case ordered the 
prosecution to disclose the source code of a probabilistic genotyping 
algorithm to the defense—after FST calculated that DNA scraped 
from two guns found in his ex-girlfriend’s apartment were 156 times 
and 66 million times more likely, respectively, to contain Mr. 
Johnson’s DNA than that of a random individual.114 Mr. Johnson 
pled guilty to illegal gun possession and was sentenced to 28 months 
in prison.115 
Although the judge ordered that the prosecution disclose the 
source code to the defense, she also issued a protective order that 
kept the source code, as well as key portions of the defense’s expert 
report challenging the validity of the algorithm, secret from the 
public.116 As one of Mr. Johnson’s defense attorneys explained, 
keeping that information secret was against the public’s interest 
because the expert’s critique of FST “affects every result that has 
ever been produced by that software.”117 After ProPublica and Yale’s 
Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic intervened to seek 
                                                                                                                 
 112. PCAST, supra note 38, at 26; see also Murphy, supra note 17, at 754 (detailing “scandals [that] 
have revealed systemic problems in a number of ‘flagship’ DNA laboratories and horrific tales of false-
positive DNA matches”). 
 113. New Jersey v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 120–21 (N.J. 2008). 
 114. Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA 
Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-
york-crime-labs-software-for-analyzing-dna-evidence [https://perma.cc/4WNV-BLPX]. 
 115. Kirchner, supra note 4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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public access to the code and defense expert’s affidavits,118 the state 
did not oppose the motion, and the court lifted the protective order.119 
The expert reports are now publicly available,120 and FST’s source 
code is on GitHub.121 
As the state recognized, the secrecy surrounding FST had 
“exacerbated the substantial misunderstanding of fundamental 
aspects of the FST source code.”122 In other words, the secrecy hurts 
the criminal justice system on all sides, impeding the process not 
only for the defense but for the prosecution as well. The public’s 
ability to scrutinize FST is likely to inure to its benefit, but defense 
counsel and lawyers focused on public access have more work to do 
to ensure that other courts follow this example—particularly because 
FST has now been phased out in favor of STRmix and other 
proprietary algorithms continue to gain customers. 
2.   Algorithms Not in the Record 
The argument for the public’s right to access probabilistic 
genotyping algorithms’ source code, training data, input parameters, 
and other auditing data is more complicated when that information is 
not explicitly part of the record—for example, in the many cases 
where defense counsel has sought and been denied access to source 
code.123 But because, as discussed in Section II.A above, the 
algorithm is so central to the functioning of the criminal trial, 
advocates nevertheless have a colorable argument for public access 
in such cases. 
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in holding that the public has a 
right to witness a lethal injection from start to finish, meaningful 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Motion to Lift the Protective Order and Unseal Judicial Records, Exhibit C: Memorandum in 
Support of Application by ProPublica for Leave to Intervene, United States v. Johnson, No. 1:15-cr-
00565-VEC (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2017). 
 119. Kirchner, supra note 114. 
 120. The affidavits are unsealed on the case docket. Motion to Lift the Protective Order and Unseal 
Judicial Records, supra note 116, nos. 153-1, 153-2. 
 121. ProPublica, New York City’s Forensic Statistical Tool, https://github.com/propublica/nyc-dna-
software [https://perma.cc/M93E-GUBD] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
 122. Kirchner, supra note 4. 
 123. See supra note 17. 
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access to a proceeding means access to its nuts and bolts. In the Ninth 
Circuit case, that meant the public has a right to view “executions 
from the moment the condemned is escorted into the execution 
chamber,” including the “initial procedures” when “the 
condemned . . . is forcibly restrained and fitted with the apparatus of 
death.”124 The court explained that, for the right of access to 
accomplish its many goals—ensuring that government processes are 
fair and humane, heightening public respect for the judicial process, 
and offering the public a sense of catharsis—“citizens must have 
reliable information about the ‘initial procedures,’ which are 
invasive, possibly painful and may give rise to serious 
complications.”125 The same must be true for the secret algorithms 
that produce the prosecution’s material evidence in a criminal trial—
which, as discussed above, also have the potential for serious 
complications and inaccuracies. Just as, without access to the initial 
procedures of an execution, “the public will be forced to rely on the 
same prison officials who are responsible for administering the 
execution to disclose and provide information about any difficulties 
with the procedure,” without access to the algorithms that create 
material evidence, the public will be forced to rely on the same 
government officials responsible for introducing the evidence and 
convincing the judge and jurors that they should trust it.126 But, much 
like prison officials, these government officials “do not have the 
same incentives to describe fully the potential shortcomings of” their 
evidence.127 Thus, in criminal trials where material evidence is 
produced by secret algorithms, this principle about access to the nuts-
and-bolts of the process must mean access to information about the 
algorithm’s accuracy and reliability. 
Indeed, courts have recognized that access to pretrial records and 
proceedings is “as important as [access to] the trial itself” because 
those proceedings are, in effect, the “only trial,” given that often 
                                                                                                                 
 124. California First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 125. Id. at 877. 
 126. Id. at 883. 
 127. Id. at 884. 
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“defendants thereafter plead[] guilty pursuant to a plea bargain.”128 
As noted in Section II.A above, the same is true of algorithms that 
calculate DNA likelihood ratios—once their results are presented, 
defendants often plead guilty and no further criminal process 
occurs.129 Access to the algorithmic code is necessary to know if the 
program—and the criminal justice process—works as claimed. The 
government cannot artificially cabin the record of a proceeding to 
deny public access to all but the ultimate result. 
Moreover, allowing the public, including academics and other 
experts, to examine DNA typing evidence would markedly improve 
the reliability and fairness of such evidence in criminal trials. As one 
scholar, Erin Murphy, has explained, numerous factors that plague 
the defense—including “structural asymmetry[,] . . . scarcity of 
resources, weak discovery practices, and high rate of plea 
bargaining”—make the “adversarial process an inadequate safeguard 
of the integrity of forensic science.”130 But experts reviewing 
publicly disclosed information about algorithms, including the source 
code, should be free of these obstacles and should have the time, 
resources, and expertise to effectively and efficiently audit the 
algorithmic programs. Moreover, allowing the public to view the 
information would avoid the potential “devastating effect” of 
protective orders that prevent expert findings in one case from 
spreading to others, where they would be equally relevant and 
useful.131 And independent review of documents across cases may 
catch errors or mistakes that would not be identifiable in one case 
alone.132 
This is particularly true of technologies that, like many 
probabilistic genotyping algorithms, have been minimally tested in 
the field. Most existing validation studies of probabilistic genotyping 
have been “conducted under idealized conditions unrepresentative of 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Georgia v. Waller, 467 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1984) (recognizing the importance of public access to 
pretrial aspects of a criminal proceeding in the Sixth Amendment context). 
 129. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 130. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 757. 
 131. Wexler, supra note 16, at 57–58. 
 132. Murphy, supra note 17, at 773. 
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the challenges of real casework.”133 Moreover, “most of the studies 
evaluating software packages have been undertaken by the software 
developers themselves.”134 Public access to algorithmic evidence 
would improve the role such evidence plays in criminal trials—
including by preventing the jury from giving it undue weight, where 
necessary—and increase the public’s confidence in the justice system 
more generally. 
B.   Private Intellectual Property Claims Cannot Defeat Public 
Access 
Because the public’s First Amendment right of access is a 
qualified one, the issue does not end with whether or not the right 
attaches to algorithmic source code. That inquiry establishes a 
presumption of openness to the code, and it may be overcome—but 
“only by an overriding interest,” which must be “based on findings” 
both “that closure is essential to preserve higher values” and that the 
closure is “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”135 
In the words of the Supreme Court, the “circumstances” in which 
“the right to an open trial may give way . . . to other rights or 
interests . . . will be rare.”136 And the case of algorithmic source code 
rarely, if ever, presents such circumstances. First, the government’s 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Roth, supra note 19, at 2033; see also PCAST, supra note 38, at 80–81 (noting that although 
TrueAllele “appear[s] to be reliable for three-person mixtures in which the minor contributor constitutes 
at least 20 percent of the intact DNA in the mixture and in which the DNA amount exceeds the minimum 
level required for the method[,] . . . there is relatively little published evidence” for “more complex 
mixtures”—precisely the sort of mixtures for which it is used in actual cases). 
 134. PCAST, supra note 38, at 80. 
 135. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enter. II), 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (quoting 
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enter. I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982); N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 
(1984) (applying Press-Enter. II to the Sixth Amendment context and holding that “the party seeking to 
close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be 
no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to 
closing the proceeding and it must make findings adequate to support the closure”). 
 136. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45 (identifying sufficiently weighty rights and interests as “the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information”). Here, 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial dovetails—rather than conflicts—with the public’s right of access to 
algorithmic source code, and the “sensitive information” the Supreme Court was contemplating in 
Waller belonged to the government, not a private party. Id. 
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only interest appears to be derivative of a private company’s 
intellectual property interest in purported trade secrets. Companies 
are concerned that such exposure could lead to copycat competitors 
and argue that the concern itself might chill innovation. But this 
private interest, on its own, will likely fail strict scrutiny.137 In fact, 
because the private “makers are under a scientific obligation to 
release this information for peer review,” the validity of the interest is 
questionable.138 As one commentator, William Thompson, put it, “If 
scientific evidence is not yet ready for both scientific scrutiny and 
public re-evaluation by others, it is not yet ready for court.”139 
Indeed, recognizing this private property interest as a sufficiently 
weighty government interest to defeat the public’s right of access 
could do serious damage to more compelling government interests, 
including the defendant’s right to a fair trial.140 Similarly, it would 
“offend[] procedural justice by signaling that the government values 
trade secrets holders as a group more than those directly affected by 
criminal justice outcomes.”141 
Even if a court found this interest sufficiently compelling, it would 
additionally have to find that the government’s request for secrecy 
was narrowly tailored to that interest to overcome the presumption of 
openness. A blanket ban on disclosure that extends not only to the 
algorithmic source code but also to material pieces of defense 
experts’ reports challenging the validity of the algorithm simply 
cannot meet that standard.142 Such a complete denial of access to a 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985); DVD Copy 
Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 15 (Cal. 2003) (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 
(2001)) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has “recognized that the First Amendment interests 
served by the disclosure of purely private information like trade secrets are not as significant as the 
interests served by the disclosure of information concerning a matter of public importance”); see also 
California First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 883 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
narrow tailoring does not comport with “forc[ing the public] to rely on the same prison officials who are 
responsible for administering the execution to disclose and provide information about any difficulties 
with the procedure”). 
 138. Mellon, supra note 17, at 1119. 
 139. Id. (quoting William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification 
Tests: Lessons from the “DNA War,” 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 100 (1993)). 
 140. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 45. 
 141. Wexler, supra note 16, at 12, 49–50. 
 142. See, e.g., ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 2, at 18, 40. 
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tool used on the public’s behalf to convict an accused person would 
surely be an exaggerated response to private interest concerns.143 
Private concerns like trade secret rights cannot win when balanced 
against the momentous and bedrock constitutional rights held by the 
public.144 
CONCLUSION 
Individuals like Mr. Johnson and Mr. Herskovic have been 
imprisoned on the basis of evidence produced by proprietary 
algorithms that neither they nor independent experts have had the 
opportunity to confront and audit. This is the wrong result. 
Where a criminal case involves a proprietary algorithm that 
produced material evidence, the strength of the public’s right of 
access should favor disclosure. This should mean disclosure of 
source code, which reveals the programmers’ intent, assumptions, 
biases, and mistakes in ways that no other form of the program can as 
easily reveal. But if a court disagrees, at a minimum, the public 
should have access to other information that could enable auditing by 
the public, such as assumptions underlying the source code, defense 
experts’ reports, and the spectrum of results the algorithm calculated. 
Such disclosure is essential to ensure that justice is occurring in our 
courtrooms, and where possible, defense counsel and access lawyers 
should work together to achieve it. 
                                                                                                                 
 143. California First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 144. See Mellon, supra note 17, at 1119. 
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